The new US federal STAND for Ukraine law says among others that:
“The President is authorized to impose with respect to a foreign person […] sanctions […] if the President determines that the foreign person […] has materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to, a foreign person that is responsible for, complicit in, or responsible for ordering, controlling, or otherwise directing, the commission of serious human rights abuses in any territory forcibly occupied or otherwise controlled by the Government of the Russian Federation […] Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall develop and implement a strategy to respond to Russian Federation-supported disinformation and propaganda efforts directed toward persons in countries bordering the Russian Federation.”
While these and other provisions are useful, the law does unfortunately not include a provision for a government-supported insurance of FDI in Ukraine against political risks. More on this continuing problem: “Political Risk Insurance for FDI in Ukraine: How the Eastern European Pivot State Can Be Saved,” HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW, 10 March 2016. http://hir.harvard.edu/political-risk-insurance-fdi-ukraine-saved/
“How Ukraine Decentralizes: An English-Language Experts Panel on the Course and Future of the Ukrainian Decentralization Reform”
Time: 29 September 2016, Thursday, 16:00-19:00
Venue: Conference room of the International Renaissance Foundation, 46 Sichovych Striltsiv Street, Kyiv, Ukraine. http://www.irf.ua/contacts/administration/
The International Renaissance Foundation (IRF), Institute for Euro-Atlantic Cooperation (IEAC) and Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) are delighted to invite you to their first specialist discussion, within a new workshop series under the title “Decentralization Experts Platform” (DEP). This inaugural session provides an overview of the current state of affairs of the decentralization reform in Ukraine. Brief presentations of Ukrainian Experts will be followed by a Q&A session. We particularly invite English-speaking foreign observers of Ukrainian domestic affairs, i.e. diplomats, journalists, researchers, NGO activists, donor organization representatives et al.
The only working language of the workshop is English, i.e. no translation into Ukrainian will be provided. Chatham House rules apply: discussion items may be referred to in publications, but should not be ascribed to any speaker or organization. Journalists may, of course, arrange to take separate interviews with the experts before or after the event.
16:00-16:10 Introduction and welcome addresses by IRF/IEAC/GIZ
• Yevhen Bystrytskiy, International Renaissance Foundation
• Andreas von Schumann, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ)
• Oleksandr Sushko, Institute for Euro-Atlantic Cooperation
16:10-16:50 Four 10-minute presentations on sub-themes of decentralization by Ukrainian experts (in English only)
“New regional policies of Ukraine in the context of decentralization”
Yuri Tretyak, Deputy Team Leader, EU-funded technical assistance programme “Support to Ukraine’s Regional Development Policy”
“Establishing the Rule of Law principles in services provision by local governments in transition times: challenges and measures”
Julia Sedyk, Project Coordinator, “Local Self-Government and the Rule of Law in Ukraine” project, Swedish governmental agency Folke Bernadotte Academy
“Implications of Ukraine’s decentralization reform for the sphere of administrative services provision”
Taras Zhuravel, Team Leader, “Reform of Municipal Services in Eastern Ukraine” project implemented by the GIZ on behalf of the German government
“The dynamics of Ukrainian public opinion to Ukraine’s decentralization”
Oksana Garnets, Senior Project Coordinator, “Decentralization Support in Ukraine” project (DESPRO) implemented by the Swiss Centre for Resource and Consultation on Development
Andreas Umland, Institute for Euro-Atlantic Cooperation
16:50-18:00 Questions & answers
18:00-19:00 Brief reception (furshet)
Please, state very briefly your professional background and work-related reasons for your interest in participating in the event in order to pre-register until 28 September under the following address:
firstname.lastname@example.org (with CC to: Andreas.Umland@StanfordAlumni.org )
As the space of the conference room is limited, the organizers regret having to reserve the right to decline registration. Admission to the event will be limited to pre-registered participants only.
Relevant English-language websites:
Facebook Event site (indicating your interest there is insufficient for pre-registration):
Political Club of Kyiv’s Shevchenko University
Lecture & discussion: ”The Intermarium and Future of Ukraine’s
Security” (in Russian language)
Time: 22 September 2016, 19:30 – 21:00
Venue: Auditorium 330, Main Building, Taras Shevchenko National
University, 60, Volodymyrska Street, Kyiv, 01601
Further details and pre-registration:
The Comeback of Russian Parliamentary #Fascism: #Zhirinovskii’s #LDPR Achieves 2nd Best National Electoral Result since Presidential Poll of 1991
Russia’s by far largest and only parliamentary fascist organization, the so-called “Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia,” will seemingly have its second best result ever, in yesterday’s State Duma elections, with over 13% in the proportional part of the voting. My first doctoral dissertation “Vladimir Zhirinovskii in Russian Politics” (FU Berlin 1997) deals in detail with the origins, rise and fascist ideology of the LDPR: https://www.academia.edu/7520397/Vladimir_Zhirinovskii_in_Russian_Politics_Three_Approaches_to_the_Emergence_of_the_Liberal-Democratic_Party_of_Russia_1990-1993_Dr._Phil._in_History_Free_University_of_Berlin_1997_
One of the various strange aspects of the 2014 “referendum” on Crimea (that I have not seen discussed yet) was that the alternative option to the peninsula’s “re-unification” with the Russian Federation, i.e. the other option of a return to Crimea’s constitution of 1992 offered in the second question, was left ambivalent. Not only was there no possibility to vote for the status quo. The “referendum’s” second option did not specify which of the two 1992 editions of that year’s constitution it referred to: the May or the September version? Compare just the first article of both versions:
1. Республика Крым является правовым, демократическим государством. На своей территории Республика обладает верховным правом в отношении природных богатств, материальных, культурных и духовных ценностей, осуществляет свои суверенные права и всю полноту власти на данной территории.
2. Республика в лице ее государственных органов и должностных лиц осуществляет на своей территории все полномочия за исключением тех, которые она добровольно делегирует Украине.
3. Компетенция Республики Крым устанавливается Конституционным Законом Республики.
1. Республика Крым является правовым, демократическим, светским государством в составе Украины.
2. Республика Крым в лице ее государственных органов и должностных лиц осуществляет на своей территории все полномочия, кроме тех, которые составляют исключительную компетенцию органов государственной власти Украины.
3. Компетенция Республики Крым устанавливается Конституцией Республики Крым и Законом Украины «О разграничении полномочий между органами государственной власти Украины и Республики Крым».
Yet, the second question in the 2014 “referendum” merely asked: “Вы за восстановление действия Конституции Республики Крым 1992 года и за статус Крыма как части Украины?” The voters would not know to which of the two 1992 texts of the constitution this question actually referred. They had thus only the choice to vote for a sure option (i.e. incorporation into Russia), or for an unclear option (i.e. another unspecified constitution).
A more obvious critique is that the question that won the “referendum” told a lie: “Вы за воссоединение Крыма с Россией на правах субъекта Российской Федерации?” Crimea could not be “re-united” with Russia, because it never was a part of “Russia” in any way different than much of the rest of Ukraine did belong to “Russia.” Arguably, there was indeed no “Russia” before 1991. There were only the Tsarist empire (including today Russia, Ukraine, Finland, Poland etc.) and the Soviet Union – to which both Crimea and most of mainland Ukraine once belonged. Almost all of the territory of today’s Ukrainian state – and not only Crimea – had been a constituent part of the “Russia” that the first question in the 2014 Crimea “referendum” referred to. Crimea remained after 1991 united with a part of that state it had before belonged to, i.e. it remained united with the Ukrainian territory of the Romanov and Bolshevik empires (to which it was and is geologically attached to, in any way). As there was thus no separation – there could also be no “re-unification.”
What is it with all these Russia “realists” popping up everywhere? I’m sorry but I prefer my Kremlin apologetics open and honest as opposed to these supposedly moderate, level-headed types who assure us they only want both sides to get along, only to insist that the only way to achieve this is to give Russia whatever it wants with nothing in return.
The inspiration for today’s piece comes from this article published in Foreign Policy by Clinton Ehrlich, an individual claiming to be the only Westerner at Moscow State Institute of International Relations, known as MGIMO in Russian. For those who don’t know, MGIMO is a very elite institution in Russia. If you’re a Russian oligarch and you failed to get your kid into Oxford, Cambridge, Harvard, Stanford, etc., you’ve still got MGIMO. That being said, there is one major caveat. Even top officials in the Kremlin insist that Russia…
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Комментарий старшего научного сотрудника Института Евроатлантического сотрудничества в Киеве Андреаса Умланда в эфире «112 Украина»
Source: Политика беспамятства